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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Etiological explanations of depression have been
proposed by a number of theorists, representing medical (see
Akiskal & McKinney, 1975), intrapsychic (e.g., Freud, 1957),
cognitive (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck,
1967;

Seligman, 1975), and interpersonal (e.g., Coyne,

1976a; Lewinsohn, 1974) perspectives.

Despite the various

causal propositions, there is general agreement on the most
common symptoms of depression:

Mental health professionals

and lay people easily recognize dejected mood, negative
self-concept, self-reproach, and feelings of worthlessness.
This transparent or obvious nature of the depressive person
has stimulated a new focus in depression research, namely,
depressive self-presentation (Hill, Weary, & Williams,
1986).

Such an approach considers socially observable

depressive symptoms to be, at least in part, intentional
ploys designed to manage or control interpersonal relationships.
This theoretical position is not recent.

Depressed

people have been characterized as blackmailing others for
attention (Fenichel, 1945), as construing others as objects
capable of providing sympathy (Cohen, 1954), and more
recently as providing" ... a set of messages demanding
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reassurance of the person's place in the interactions he is
still able to maintain ... " (Coyne, 1976a, p. 33).

Despite

the history of recognition by theorists of the intentional,
and/or goal-directed nature of depressives' social actions,
research has primarily focused on testing the more mechanistic theories of Beck (1967), Seligman (1975; also see
Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), and Lewinsohn (1974),
which do not incorporate concepts like intentions or goals.
The purpose of this thesis is to extend the empirical
literature related to the depressive self-presentation
perspective.

Chapter I continues with an explication of the

most recent depressive self-presentation theory (i.e., Hill
et al., 1986).

This is followed by an examination of

research that can be used to evaluate this perspective.
Chapter II then provides an overview of the thesis experiment, and delineates the hypotheses for the main dependent
variable.

Additional variables are introduced in Chapter

III, and corresponding hypotheses are presented.

The method

and results are the topics of Chapters IV and V, respectively.

Finally, the results are discussed in Chapter VI.
Depressive Self-Presentation
Strategic self-presentation has been defined as "the

more or less intentional control of appearances in order to
guide and control the responses made by others to us" (Weary

& Arkin, 1981, p. 225).

Arkin (1981) added a distinction

between a protective self-presentation style and the gener-
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ally recognized acquisitive (to acquire or gain social
approval) self-presentation style.

The protective self-

presentation style is conceptualized as a conservative
orientation toward social interactions associated with a
preoccupation with what can be lost through interactions
rather than what can be gained.
Recently, Hill, Weary, and Williams (1986) proposed a
self-presentation formulation of depression that claims
depressives typically employ a protective self-presentation
style.

To rationalize this view, these authors propose that

self-doubt, low self-confidence, and social anxiety increase
the probability that a depressed individual, within a social
interaction context, will experience elevated concern over
social evaluations.

This evaluation apprehension, in turn,

leads him or her to employ a protective self-presentation
style across a variety of social interaction settings.

For

depressives, the common manifestations of this interpersonal
style are expected to be highly modest descriptions of
accomplishments, social reticence, and in extreme cases,
social avoidance or withdrawal (Hill et al., 1986).

Despite

the suggestion that social avoidance is an extreme expression of depressive self-presentation, Hill et al. argue that
"the underlying motive is likely to be avoidance of future
performance demands and potential further losses in selfesteem" (1986, p. 214).

Moreover, they claim that depres-

sives may endure short-term discomfort to achieve this goal
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(1986, p. 234).
Before reviewing empirical evidence related to the Hill
et al.

(1986) formulation, a few theoretical and meta-

theoretical issues are addressed.

First, the Hill et al.

(1986) theory does not attempt to explain the etiology of
depression.

In fact, in the current explication, it is not

clear whether a protective self-presentation style could
exist prior to the onset of depression as, perhaps, a
predisposing factor.

At best then, Hill et al.'s (1986)

theory concerns itself with the maintenance and exacerbation
of depression.

Second, the hypothesized chain of events

that leads to the adoption of a protective self-presentation
style is quite mechanistic and thus fundamentally at variance with an intentional formulation.

Typically, theories

incorporating intentions do not juxtapose these intentions
with efficient causation (i.e., "billiard ball causation;"
one event leads to another event that leads to another event
... , in a time-ordered relationship), as does the suggestion
that social anxiety and self-doubt lead to evaluation
apprehension and then the intentional adoption of a protective self-presentation style.

Moreover, Hill et al.'s

(1986) formulation is weak insofar as the theoretical perspective shifts between what Rychlak (1990) would term an
extraspective orientation (e.g., social anxiety) and an
introspective orientation (e.g., self-doubt, evaluation
apprehension, intention).

Briefly, an extraspective orien-
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tation tends to ignore the conscious experiences of the
subject, while an introspective orientation considers
conscious experiences.

Thus, to use both extraspective and

introspective concepts begs the question of which concepts
are primary.

For example, does self-doubt cause social

anxiety or vice versa?

It would be metatheoretically more

consistent to use either the extraspective or the introspective orientation, but not both.
Review of Empirical Evidence
Only one study has attempted to test Hill et al.'s
(1986) main contention that depressives' primary goal in
self-presentation is the avoidance of future performance
demands and potential self-esteem loss.

This study, con-

ducted by Weary and Williams (1990), employed a strategic
failure paradigm, and will be presented last because it is
most relevant to the thesis experiment.

First, several

studies that were conducted to test other theories, but
indirectly test the depressive self-presentation formulation, will be reviewed.
Public-private Manipulations
One method employed to assess self-presentation motives
in depression is a manipulation of publicity.
studies will be reviewed.

Four such

Although none of these experi-

ments was designed specifically to test the Hill et al.
(1986) formulation, the public-private manipulation can
assess its premise.

A finding that depressives exhibit more
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pathological behaviors and verbalizations in public than in
private would be supportive of the idea that depressives
intentionally modify their behaviors and verbalizations when
in a social context.
Sacco and Hokanson (1978; 1982) conducted two studies
that incorporated a public-private manipulation.

In both,

the public condition was defined as having an experimenter
present, and the private condition was defined as having no
experimenter present.

In the 1978 study, Sacco and Hokanson

measured subjects' performance expectation change before
each trial of a 15-trial perceptual task, while randomly
administering success and failure feedback after each trial
(50% success, 50% failure).

A total expectancy change score

was computed such that higher scores indicated expectations
for better performance on the upcoming task.

The research-

ers found a significant mood x publicity interaction indicating that depressed subjects reported more positive
expectancy change in private than in public conditions,
while nondepressed subjects reported more positive expectancy change in public than in private conditions.

Only the

depressed-private versus nondepressed-private comparison was
statistically significant; however, given that the group
size was 8 (resulting in low statistical power), the large
effect sizes of the study, in this particular pattern, can
arguably be considered supportive of the Hill et al.
depressive self-presentation theory.

1

(1986)
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In the 1982 study, Sacco and Hokanson measured depressed and nondepressed subjects' self-reinforcement for
prior task performance on a 22-trial skill task, while
controlling the success rate such that subjects received
either a high rate of success followed by a low rate of
success (high-low), or vice versa (low-high).

Analysis of

average self-reinforcement revealed a significant mood x
publicity x success rate interaction.

To investigate this

further, Sacco and Hokanson conducted separate mood x
publicity analyses for successful and unsuccessful trials.
Only the analysis for successful trials yielded a statistically significant result, namely a mood x publicity interaction.

Although no group comparisons were statistically

significant, depressed subjects self-reinforced numerically
more often in private than in public, whereas nondepressed
subjects self-reinforced numerically more often in public
than in private.

Unfortunately, no standard deviations were

provided, which render an estimate of effect sizes impossible.

However, given the small average group size of 9, and

the resulting low statistical power (see footnote 1), this
pattern of results arguably supports the Hill et al. depressive self-presentation theory.
Silven and Hokanson (1987) extended the work of Sacco
and Hokanson (1978; 1982) by investigating the self-evaluations of depressed and nondepressed subjects in an interpersonal task.

They reasoned that the tasks employed in the
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work of Sacco and Hokanson (1978; 1982) were innocuous,
nonsocial laboratory tasks and that the findings were
therefore limited in generalizability.

In their study,

depressed and nondepressed subjects were asked to speak
extemporaneously to a "fellow subject" (confederate) on 12
topics, for 90 seconds per topic.

Half of the subjects

performed this task in the presence of an experimenter
(public setting) and the remaining subjects performed this
task with the experimenter absent (private setting).
each speech, subjects rated their own performance.

After
Results

indicate a significant mood x publicity interaction such
that depressed subjects in the private condition rated their
performance significantly more favorably than depressed
subjects in the public condition, whereas nondepressedpublic subjects did not differ from nondepressed-private
subjects.

So, with an interpersonal task, Silven and

Hokanson replicated the supportive findings of previous
public-private experiments.

It is interesting to note that

the effect sizes (see Footnote 1) of this study were comparable to those of Sacco and Hokanson (1978; 1982), yet this
study yielded significant findings and Sacco and Hokanson's
did not.

The likely reason is that Silven and Hokanson

(1987) had more statistical power with a group size of 24
(see Footnote 1).
Finally, Layne, Lefton, Walters, and Merry (1983)
employed a different type of public-private manipulation and
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found no mood x publicity interaction.

These researchers

defined "public" as a condition in which subjects were told
that an experimenter would meet with them at a later date to
discuss their responses to various questionnaires.

"Pri-

vate" was defined as a condition in which subjects were told
that their responses to questionnaires would remain conf idential.

In contrast to the previously mentioned public-

private manipulations (Sacco & Hokanson, 1978, 1982; Silven

& Hokanson, 1987), the experimenter was always present.
Results revealed only main effects, with depressives exhibiting more pathology than nondepressives.

On the one hand,

this finding seems at odds with Hill et al.'s (1986) depressive self-presentation theory; regardless of publicity
level, depressives displayed more pathology than nondepressives, suggesting this display was not for the sake of
social goals.

On the other hand, if the efficacy of Layne

et al. 's public-private manipulation is questioned, and one
considers all experimental conditions to be public because
the experimenter was always present, this finding is supportive of Hill et al.'s (1986) formulation; that is,
depressives reported more pathology than nondepressives in a
public setting.
In sum, these public-private experiments may be interpreted as bolstering the position that depressives tend to
exhibit different, usually more modest, behaviors and
verbalizations in public than in private conditions, which
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supports Hill et al. 's (1986) depressive self-presentation
formulation.

It is important to underscore, however, that

the effects of these studies often did not achieve statistical significance (e.g., Sacco & Hokanson, 1978, 1982).

This

was likely due to low statistical power, but may also have
been due to weaknesses inherent in the manipulation of
publicity.

Indeed, several authors have questioned the

strength of this manipulation (e.g., Arkin & Baumgardner,
1986; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985).

One concern is that some

self-presentations are intended for the self or imagined
audiences; thus, the presence or absence of an experimenter
may not produce different behaviors (Tetlock & Manstead,
1985).

A second related concern is that public behaviors

are not orthogonal to private behaviors; that is, behaviors
exhibited in public may affect one's private behaviors and
vice versa (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985).

Finally, a social

context or setting may not be directly related to selfpresentations (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1986).
Self-handicapping
Self-handicapping has been described as a self-presentation strategy whereby a person presents some impediment
that could interfere with his or her ability to perform
future tasks; in essence, an excuse for poor future performance is provided (cf. Baumgardner, Lake, & Arkin, 1985).
Although this strategy may result in acquisition of selfesteem if one is successful in future performances, the main
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goal of this strategy is considered protective (see Arkin &
Baumgardner, 1986).

Thus, finding that depressives self-

handicap would be supportive of Hill et al.'s (1986) depressive self-presentation theory insofar as depressives would
have employed a protective self-presentation style.

Unfor-

tunately, despite the fact that self-handicapping has
received much empirical attention (e.g., Baumgardner, Lake,

& Arkin, 1985; Berglas & Jones, 1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978;
Smith, Snyder, & Handelsman, 1982; Snyder, Smith, Augelli, &
Ingram, 1985), assessment of whether depressives employ
self-handicapping strategies has largely been ignored.

Two

exceptions were an experiment conducted by Baumgarder, Lake,
and Arkin (1985), which did not incorporate a depressionnondepression subject variable, but which indirectly tested
the feasibility of this notion, and a subsequent study
conducted by Baumgardner (1991), which did incorporate a
mood subject variable, and thus provided a more direct test.
Baumgardner, Lake, and Arkin (1985) investigated
whether subjects (no mood subject variable was employed)
would implicate depressed mood as a handicap for a future
performance.

Participants first completed a "social accura-

cy" test, which was described as a measure of ability to
make judgments about other peoples' personalities and
motivations.

Subjects then received false feedback indicat-

ing that they had failed.

Half of the subjects were told

that the experimenter was aware of their performance ("pub-
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lie"), while the remaining subjects were told that the
experimenter was not aware of their performance ("private"). 2

A second task, ostensibly a separate experiment

assessing memory, was then described.

Half of the subjects

were led to believe that poor mood would inhibit performance
on this second task, while the other half received no
handicapping information.

All subjects then completed a

mood questionnaire and were led to believe that the experimenter would be aware of the affective state that it revealed.

Results indicated that subjects who believed that

the experimenter was unaware of their previous failure, and
that negative mood would inhibit performance on the upcoming
task, were more likely to report disturbed affect than when
they believed that the experimenter had knowledge of their
previous failure.
The investigators concluded that subjects with "a
spoiled public identity" had no reason to protect their
public image from damage and thus did not need to handicap
their future performance, while subjects who had privately
failed could still protect their untainted public image by
employing the handicap of poor mood.

Baumgardner et al.

(1985) confronted the possible alternative explanation that
the negative affect expressed by subjects may have been due
to "failure."

The researchers claimed that this was doubt-

ful because a public failure seems more likely to produce
negative affect than a private failure, and their findings
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displayed the opposite pattern.
Although Baumgardner, Lake, and Arkin (1985) did not
assess whether depressives would implicate their mood as a
handicap, the finding that subjects in general present poor
mood as a handicap suggests the likelihood that depressives
present their legitimate affective disturbance as a handicap.

Empirical support for this inference is provided in a

subsequent study by Baumgardner (1991), which incorporated a
depression-nondepression subject variable and roughly the
same methodology as Baumgardner et al.

(1985).

Subjects

first completed a "social accuracy" test and were led to
believe that either the experimenter would be aware of how
well they performed ("public") or not aware ("private;" see
footnote 2).

In contrast to the Baumgardner et al.

(1985)

study, in which all subjects were given failure feedback,
half of the subjects were given success feedback and half
were given failure feedback for the initial task.

Then,

half of the subjects were told that a negative mood would
handicap their performance on an upcoming "memory task."
Finally, the mood measure was administered and subjects were
led to believe that the experimenter would be aware of the
affective state that it revealed.
When subjects believed poor mood would handicap their
performance, results indicated the following:

(a) after

publicly succeeding and after publicly failing, depressed
subjects reported more negative mood than nondepressed
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subjects;

(b) after private failure, depressed subjects

reported more negative mood than nondepressed subjects;
(c) after private success, depressed and nondepressed
subjects did not differ in their presentation of mood
symptoms.

3

No differences in the presentation of mood were

observed when subjects did not receive handicapping information.

With only one exception, Baumgardner (1991) consid-

ered these results supportive of her protective self-presentation predictions.

The exception was that depressed

subjects reported more negative mood than nondepressed
subjects when they publicly failed.

This was interpreted by

Baumgardner as opposing a protective self-presentation
viewpoint because these depressed-public-failure subjects
had already "spoiled" their public self-image and should
have had no reason to self-handicap.

However, in contrast

to this interpretation, one can view this presentation of
depressive symptoms after public failure as a "damage
control" maneuver.

These subjects failed but still had

another task to perform.

Why not provide a handicap for

that task to minimize further damage to their public selfimage?

It seems that Baumgardner's interpretation is

inappropriately assuming that depressed subjects should
claim affective disturbance as a handicap in the same manner
that all subjects have (as in Baumgardner et al., 1985).
What is interpreted by Baumgardner as opposing a protective
self-presentation perspective seems rather to indicate
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uniqueness in depressive self-presentation; that is,
depressed subjects, in contrast to nondepressed subjects,
may employ protective self-handicaps, despite a ''spoiled
public identity," to protect what remains of their public
image.
To sum up, these self-handicapping studies supported
the idea that depressed subjects are more likely than
nondepressed subjects to adopt an available handicap for
future performances.

Moreover, this handicap may be a

presentation of depressive symptomatology.

Interestingly,

in contrast to nondepressives, depressives were found to
persist with such protective self-presentations even when
they had what Baumgardner referred to as a "spoiled public
identity" (Baumgardner, 1991; Baumgardner et al., 1985).
These findings support the Hill et al.

(1986) depressive

self-presentation formulation.
Consequences of Depressive Self-presentation
Hill et al.

(1986) claimed that depressives may endure

short-term discomfort to achieve their protective selfpresentation goals.

It is important, therefore, to assess

the consequences of depressive self-presentation.

Two

predictions follow from the depressive self-presentation
theory:

(1) depressives' pathological or symptomatic self-

presentations may result in negative or unpleasant shortterm consequences; yet,

(2) such self-presentations may

ultimately protect them or provide a more comfortable
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situation.

Once again, data collected for purposes other

than specifically testing Hill et al. 's (1986) theory can be
considered.
The first prediction, that short-term negative consequences follow depressive presentations, has been addressed
by several studies of the interpersonal consequences of the
presentation of depressive symptomatology (e.g., Coyne,
1976b; Hammen & Peters, 1978; Howes & Hokanson, 1978).

The

typical procedure involves the establishment of communication between a nondepressed subject and either a depressed
or nondepressed individual.

Following this communication,

interpersonal reactions are measured.

In all but a few

studies, results indicate that people who present depressive
symptomatology experience social rejection and devaluation
(cf. Gurtman, Martin, & Hintzman, 1990).

These findings

support Hill et al. 's (1986) contention that depressives
endure negative consequences after symptomatic presentations; whether consequences are short-term awaits empirical
investigation.
The second prediction, that depressive presentations
protect depressives or ultimately provide a more comfortable
situation, was indirectly tested by Schouten and Handelsman
(1987).

These researchers investigated whether presented

depressive symptoms reduce the amount of personal responsibility people attribute to depressives for their socially
undesirable behaviors.

Since it is probable that reduction

17
of responsibility protects depressives or provides a more
comfortable situation, this tests the second prediction.
Schouten and Handelsman (1987) asked subjects to respond to
vignettes that portrayed protagonists in either a domestic
violence situation or a poor job performance situation.

The

protagonists were described as (a) experiencing no symptoms
of depression, (b) experiencing symptoms of depression, or
(c) experiencing symptoms of depression and having a history
of depressive episodes.

Findings indicated that, across

situations, depressive symptoms significantly reduced
subjects' attributions of the protagonist's personal responsibility.

Thus, as Hill et al.

(1986) suggested, a

depressed person may benefit from the presentation of
depressive symptomatology, insofar as people decrease their
attributions of responsibility for the depressive's
actions.
The Strategic Failure Paradigm
Strategic failure methodology represents a novel
approach to the investigation of self-presentation.

The

general procedure involves the creation of a situation in
which failure is a possible means for a subject to achieve
hypothesized self-presentation goals, yet success is attainable by virtually all subjects.

With this design, when a

subject fails, it is likely that he or she did so intentionally.
Weary and Williams (1990) designed a strategic failure
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experiment specifically to test Hill et al. 's (1986) claim
that the main goal of depressive self-presentation is the
avoidance of future performance demands and potential losses
in self-esteem.

Depressed and nondepressed subjects per-

formed a simple visual-motor task.

Half the depressed and

nondepressed subjects were told that if they were successful
on the task, they would perform a second similar task, while
the remaining subjects were not given this expectation of a
conditional future performance.

Results indicated that,

compared to all other subjects, depressed-future-performance
subjects were more likely to fail.

In addition, these

depressed-future-performance subjects experienced more
negative affect as a result of their poor performance.

The

authors concluded that these results support the Hill et al.
(1986) formulation of depressive self-presentation.

Depres-

sives seemed to fail intentionally in order to avoid a
future performance, and they endured negative affect as a
result.
Summary and Conclusions
The literature offers a good deal of converging support
for Hill et al. 's (1986) formulation of depressive selfpresentation.

Depressed subjects exhibited more pathologi-

cal behaviors and verbalizations in public than in private
(Sacco & Hokanson, 1978, 1982; Silven & Hokanson, 1987), and
they tended to present depressive symptoms most when doing
so would serve as a handicap to protect their public self-
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image (Baumgardner, 1991).

In addition, there was evidence

suggesting that presentations of depressive symptoms indeed
serve a protective function in society (Schouten and
Handelsman, 1987), yet result in negative consequences,
particularly social rejection (e.g., Coyne, 1976b; Hammen &
Peters, 1978; Howes & Hokanson, 1979; Weary & Williams,
1990).

Finally, the proposed depressive self-presentation

primary goal of avoiding future performance demands was
supported (Weary & Williams, 1990).
Despite substantial indirect evidence, Hill et al. 's
(1986) depressive self-presentation theory has received very
little attention from researchers.

Weary and Williams

(1990), with their strategic failure experiment, provided
the only direct test of this formulation.

It is because of

this dearth of direct evidence, and the striking findings of
the Weary and Williams (1990) study, that a replication and
extension of the strategic failure methodology was employed
in the current study.

CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW AND MAIN HYPOTHESES
The Weary and Williams (1990) study yielded a large
effect suggesting that depressives will strategically fail,
as a self-presentation strategy, in order to avoid a future
performance.

For the sake of replicating this meaningful

finding, the previously described strategic failure methodology was employed in the current study, but with important
modifications.

These methodological extensions addressed

two weaknesses in the Weary and Williams (1990) study.

By

way of an elaboration on these weaknesses and the present
experiment's methodological means of confronting them, the
first section of this chapter provides an overview of the
current experiment and the main dependent variable.

The

remainder of the chapter delineates hypotheses for the main
dependent variable, as derived from depressive self-presentation theory (i.e., Hill et al., 1986).
Experiment Overview
The first problem with the Weary and Williams (1990)
experiment was that the task employed (pushing pins into a
corkboard) may have been unimportant to subjects.

Depressed

subjects might have failed because they were not motivated
to perform a second similar task, rather than because of a
20
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desire to avoid a future performance and the potential selfesteem loss associated with such a performance.

It is also

difficult to imagine a task in the "real world" that would
parallel the task employed in the Weary and Williams (1990)
study.

Even if such trivial tasks exist in the environment,

it seems questionable that failure on these tasks would have
important consequences.

The implications of intentional

failure on an important task would certainly be more significant.

If depressives also intentionally fail important

tasks, it would suggest that they are willing to debase
others' current perceptions of them, along important dimensions, merely to avoid the possibility of future negative
evaluations.

This would be a highly dysfunctional charac-

teristic and seems more likely to result in maintenance
and/or exacerbation of depression than intentional failure
on trivial tasks.

Thus, an investigation of strategic

failure using an important task, rather than a trivial task,
would contribute significantly to the depression literature.
To overcome this potential motivation or task importance problem, a 5-letter anagram task, described as a
measure of intelligence and a predictor of college grades
and aptitude test scores, was employed in the current
experiment.

To insure that all subjects were capable of

passing the task--a requirement of the strategic failure
methodology--the anagrams were constructed using words that
were "judged by subjects as being reasonably familiar and
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concrete," and that have single-solution anagrams (Gilhooly

& Hay, 1977, p.12).

The task was also subjected to pilot

testing and the criteria for success were selected such that
all pilot subjects passed.

It is noteworthy too that no

significant difference in performance between depressed and
nondepressed subjects was observed on this task during pilot
testing.
The second problem with the Weary and Williams (1991)
study was that the experiment did not directly assess
whether the reason for failure is avoidance of self-esteem
loss.

Recall that the major goals of depressive self-

presentation (Hill et al., 1986) are avoidance of future
performance demands and the potential loss of self-esteem
associated with such future performance demands.

Indeed,

Weary and Williams (1990) assessed whether depressed subjects fail in order to avoid a future performance, but they
provided no means of determining whether avoidance of
potential self-esteem loss is a goal of strategic failure.
To examine the notion that depressives strategically
fail in order to avoid self-esteem loss, a three-level
variable, which manipulated the expected difficulty of the
second task compared to the first, was added to the Weary
and Williams (1990) design.

The difficulty of the second

task was described as "easier," "similar," or "harder" than
the first; in addition, the second task was defined in terms
of the number of letters per anagram (3, 5, and 13 letters,
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respectively).

The rationale for the inclusion of this

manipulation was that depressed subjects led to expect an
easier future task should be less concerned about future
loss of self-esteem than depressed subjects who expected a
harder future task.

If avoidance of self-esteem loss is the

goal of intentional failure, then failure should be less
likely to occur when the avoidable task is described as
easier than the first, and more likely to occur when the
avoidable task is described as harder than the first.
In brief, the current experiment was a 2 (mood:
depressed, nondepressed) x 2 (future performance: no future
performance, future performance) x 3 (difficulty expectancy:
easier, similar, harder) between-subjects factorial design.
Main Hypotheses
Based on the foregoing reasoning, two sets of hypotheses were derived from the Hill et al.

(1986) theory.

The

first set of hypotheses predicted performance on the anagram
task in terms of success and failure.

The second set of

hypotheses predicted the pattern of performance scores
(varying continuously) across conditions that would be
supportive of a self-presentation perspective.

Hypotheses

for the dichotomous (success v. failure) analysis of performance scores are presented in the following subsection, and
the final subsection of this chapter delineates hypotheses
for the analysis of performance scores coded as a continuous
variable.
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Hypotheses for Success/Failure Performance Analysis
Among the no-future-performance conditions, failure was
predicted to be no more likely for depressed subjects than
for nondepressed subjects, across each of the levels of
difficulty expectancy.

Moreover, little or no failure was

predicted for these groups.

On the other hand, among the

future-performance conditions, depressed subjects were
expected to fail more often in the harder condition than the
similar condition, and more often in the similar condition
than the easier condition.

In contrast, it was hypothesized

that nondepressed subjects would not fail in any of the
future-performance conditions--that is, regardless of the
expected difficulty of the second task.

Thus, a 3-way

interaction was predicted.
Hypotheses for Performance Score Analysis
This study employed a more important task than Weary
and Williams (1990) to challenge and/or extend the finding
of depressive strategic failure.

The aim was to better

determine the conditions under which a depressed person will
or will not intentionally fail.

Indeed, little or no

failure, particularly in all but the depressed-futureperformance-harder condition, was considered a distinct
possibility, because of the importance of the first
task and the potential loss of self-esteem related to
intentional failure on that task.

What must not be

forgotten, however, is that the critical concern, of both
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the weary and Williams (1990) study and the current study,
is testing depressive self-presentation theory.

Strategic

failure is one of many potential empirical observations
sufficient to support depressive self-presentation theory;
however, strategic failure is not necessary for the theory
to be supported.

Thus, if no intentional failure is found

in the current study, Hill et al. 's (1986) theory could
remain intact.

Moreover, performance scores, coded as a

continuous variable, may nonetheless be supportive of
depressive self-presentation theory.

Let us consider how

this might be so.
If, as theoretically expected, subjects vary across
conditions in terms of their desire to avoid the future task
(theoretically due to differential probability of loss to
self-esteem across conditions), performance scores should be
appropriately affected, insofar as toying (mentally and/or
behaviorally) with failure on the first task will likely
decrease first task performance.

For example, a depressed

subject expecting a harder second task will likely entertain
the possibility of intentional failure more than a depressed
subject expecting a similar task or an easier task.

It

follows that performance scores should be lower for a
depressed subject expecting a harder second task than for a
depressed subject expecting an easier second task, regardless of whether any subjects decided to fail the task.
More formally and fully, it was predicted that among
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the no-future-performance conditions, no differences in
performance will emerge for depressed subjects, nor for
nondepressed subjects, across the levels of difficulty
expectancy.

On the other hand, among the future-performance

conditions, depressed subjects were expected to perform more
poorly in the harder condition than the similar condition,
and more poorly in the similar condition than the easier
condition.

In contrast, it was hypothesized that no perfor-

mance differences would emerge for nondepressed subjects, in
any of the future-performance conditions--that is, regardless of the expected difficulty of the second task.
3-way interaction was predicted.

Thus, a

CHAPTER III
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES
In addition to measurement of task performance, this
study, like Weary and Williams (1990), includes measures of
other theoretically relevant constructs, namely, affective
distress, causal attributions, and self-evaluation.

While

elaborate descriptions of all measurements employed will
follow (see chapter IV), this chapter shall briefly discuss
the a priori predictions for affective distress, causal
attributions, and self-evaluation.
Affective Distress
There were two main reasons for the measurement of
affective distress.

One reason was to assess changes in

distress associated with the future performance and difficulty manipulations.

Another reason was to assess the

impact of subjects' performance on their affective distress.
Each aim shall be dealt with in turn.
First, the impact of the future performance and dif f icul ty expectation manipulations on distress will be investigated to determine whether, as Hill et al.

(1986) claimed,

depressed subjects experience more distress than nondepressed subjects when confronted with performance demands.
Specifically, based on Hill et al., it was expected that
27
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depressed subjects expecting a future performance will be
more distressed than all other subjects (depressed and
nondepressed).

Furthermore, if self-esteem loss is a

concern, depressed subjects expecting a harder second task
should exhibit more distress than depressed subjects expecting a similar task, and depressed subjects expecting a
similar task should exhibit more distress than depressed
subjects expecting an easier second task.
Regarding the second aim, affective distress was
expected to be greater for depressed subjects who fail than
for all other subjects.

This prediction was theoretically

derived from Hill et al.

(1986), but was also based on Weary

and Williams's (1990) empirical finding of relatively more
negative affect among depressed subjects who failed their
initial task, than among other depressed subjects who did
not fail, and all nondepressed subjects.
Causal Attributions
According to Hill et al. 's (1986) depressive selfpresentation theory, depressives report depressogenic
attributions for negative events not because they truly
possess a "depressogenic attributional style," as cognitive
theorists claim (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
1978), but rather as a self-presentation strategy.

In this

study, as in Weary and Williams (1990), performance attributions were measured after subjects had performed the anagram
task; hence, depressed-failure subjects would not need to
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present depressogenic attributions for self-presentation
purposes because the hypothesized main goal of avoidance
would have been achieved through failure.

Accordingly, it

was predicted that no significant differences in attributions among depressed-failure, depressed-success, and
nondepressed subjects would be observed, as was the case in
Weary and Williams (1990).
Self-evaluation
A measure of self-evaluation was given to subjects
prior to any experimental manipulations.

Following Weary

and Williams (1990), the purpose of the administration was
to assess whether the current sample of depressed subjects
have "shaky self-confidence and numerous self-doubts" (p.
895) like most depressives.

This was important to determine

because Hill et al. 's (1986) theory suggests that poor selfevaluation (confidence, etc.) are important antecedents of a
protective self-presentation style.

CHAPTER IV
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 309 undergraduates from the introductory
psychology subject pool of Loyola University of Chicago.
Eighty-seven subjects were male (28.2%), and 222 subjects
were female (71.8%).

Scores of 10 or greater on the Beck

Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979)
placed 112 subjects (26 males; 86 females) in the depressed
group

(~

= 16.41, SD= 5.80), and scores of 9 or lower

placed 197 subjects (61 males; 136 females) in the nondepressed group (M = 4.84, SD= 2.61).

A block randomiza-

tion procedure was employed, by four investigators, to place
each depressed and nondepressed subject in one of the six
experimental conditions.

No blocking for gender was em-

ployed because no gender differences were expected.
Table 1 displays the mean BDI score, the BDI standard
deviation, and the number of subjects, per group.

To assess

whether there were differences in level of depression
associated with the future performance and/or difficulty
expectancy conditions, simple effects and interactions of
these variables were investigated for the depressed and
nondepressed groups.

Only for depressed subjects did an
30
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Table 1
BDI Means and Standard Deviations per Group.
Difficulty Expectancy
Easier
Depressed
Future Task
Expected
No Future Task
Expected
Nondepressed
Future Task
Expected
No Future Task
Expected

Similar

Harder

M 17.21a
SD 7.2S
n
19

14.lla
3.23
18

1S.06a
4.39
18

M 17.84a
SD 8.04
n
19

17.6Sa
S.6S
20

16.33a
4.27
18

M
SD
n

4.84b
2.9S
31

4.33b
2.SS
33

4.78b
2.80
32

M
SD
n

S.24b
2.48
33

4.71b
2.S8
3S

S.12b
2.42
33

Note: Different superscripts denote a significant difference, at p < .OS, according to Tukey (HSD) computations.
effect emerge:

a simple future-performance main effect

(F(l,297) = S.24, p < .OS), which indicated that depressed
subjects expecting a future performance

(~

= lS.49, SD =

S.3S) were slightly less depressed (effect size of roughly
.3; see Cohen, 1988) than depressed-no-future-performance
subjects (M = 17.30, SD= 6.12).

This finding was consid-

ered important to keep in mind for the interpretation of the
results; however, Tukey's "honestly significant difference"
(HSD) contrasts among BDI means revealed no significant
differences (ps > .OS) across the depressed conditions,
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which suggested that the simple effect may have been due to
chance alone (see Table 1).
Materials
(Note: Appendices contain all materials except the BDI and
the Rosenberg Inventory, which were omitted due to copyrights.)
Primary Measures
Anagram Task
The anagram task (Appendix A) contained 30 5-letter,
single solution anagrams.

The words used were selected from

the Gilhooly and Hay (1977) list.

Words were

"not plurals,

were not proper names, could be used as nouns, and were
judged by subjects as being reasonably familiar and concrete" (Gilhooly & Hay, 1977, p.12).

Anagrams were created

by randomly scrambling word letters.

Based on pilot data,

success was defined as 13 or more items correct in 12
minutes or less.

All pilot subjects

(~

= 39; 15 depressed

and 24 nondepressed, using same BDI criteria as the current
study) succeeded based on these criteria.

Moreover, no

significant performance difference between depressed and
nondepressed subjects was observed on this task (t(37) =
1.25, 2 > .OS).
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
The BDI (Beck et al., 1979) is frequently employed in
psychological research as a measure of depressive symptomatology.

The instrument has demonstrated acceptable inter-
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nal consistency (coefficient alpha range of .73 to .92 in
non-psychiatric samples; see Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988),
and adequate evidence of content, construct, and concurrent
validity in student samples has been reported (see Beck et
al., 1988; Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978).

The

discriminant validity of the BDI is still at issue, however
(see Beck et al., 1988 vs. Gotlib, 1984).

A cut-off score

of 10 or greater as indicative of depression is consistent
with Kovacs and Beck's (1977) classification of subjects as
at least mildly depressed.
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL)
The MAACL (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) is a list of moodrelated adjectives.

For the "state" version, which was used

in the current study, subjects place a check mark next to
the adjectives that describe their current mood.
scores are typically derived:
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a depression score, a hostil-

ity score, and an anxiety score.

For the present experi-

ment, the MAACL was randomly divided into two short forms
with an equal number of depression, hostility, and anxiety
items on each (Appendix B).

One form was administered prior

to the experimental manipulations (Time 1), and the other
was administered after subjects completed the anagram task
(Time 2).

To control for possible form differences, the

order of administration was counterbalanced.
Although the MAACL (complete form) has displayed
adequate internal reliability (coefficient alpha range of
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.74 to .83; Lubin, Zuckerman, Hanson, Armstrong, Rinck, &
seever, 1986), evidence has suggested that the subscales of
the MAACL poorly discriminate among specific affective
states (see Clark & Watson, 1991).

Based on this evidence,

and for the sake of the increased reliability inherent in a
longer form, a composite "distress" score was used in
analyses.
Performance Attributions Questionnaire (PAQ)
After the anagram task and the post-performance manipulation check questionnaire (PPMC; to be described), subjects
completed a 2-page performance attributions questionnaire
(Appendix C).

The first page requested that subjects rate,

on 11-point Likert-type scales, the extent to which their
success or failure on the experimental task was due to task
difficulty, their effort, and their ability.

Also, subjects

rated the extent to which their performance was under their
own control.

These four questions were based on the ideas

of Heider (1958; see also Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest,

& Rosenbaum, 1972), and were similar to those used in Weary
and Williams (1990).
The second page of the PAQ requested that subjects rate
whether the cause of their success or failure on the experimental task was due to them or something else, will be
present in the future when doing similar tasks, and will
influence performance on other types of tasks.

Also,

subjects rated the importance of their success or failure on
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the experimental task.

These four questions were modeled

after the frequently used Attributional Style Questionnaire
(ASQ; Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky,
Seligman, 1982).
Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory
The Rosenberg Inventory (Rosenberg, 1969) consists of
10 Likert-type, face-valid self-evaluation questions.

This

measure is frequently employed in psychological research as
a measure of self-esteem and it has demonstrated adequate
internal consistency (coefficient alpha range of .72 to .87;
cf. Wylie, 1974) and test-retest reliability (r = .85; cf.
Wylie, 1974).

There is some debate, however, based on

factor analytic studies, about whether the questionnaire
measures a unidimensional construct (Wylie, 1974).

For

example, some authors have argued (e.g., Kaplin & Pokorny,
1969) that two dimensions are being measured:

self-deroga-

tion and defense of self-worth.
Control Variables
Word fluency
As a measure of the speed and ease with which words are
used, the Word Fluency component of the Schaie-Thurstone
Adult Mental Abilities Test (Schaie, 1985) was administered
prior to any experimental manipulations.

The task requires

that subjects write as many words as possible that begin
with the letter "S" during a five-minute period (see Appendix D for the form used).

If subjects differ on this
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measure across conditions, it will be entered into statistical computations as a covariate to insure that differences
in performance on the anagram task are not due to verbal
ability.

Although little empirical evidence exists to

assess the validity of this task as a measure of verbal
ability, adequate test-retest reliability has been demonstrated (r range of .70 to .78; cf. Schaie, 1985).
Writing Speed
As a measure of motor speed, subjects were asked to
write as many numbers as possible, from 100 backward, during
a one-minute period (see Appendix E for the form used).
This task was administered at Time 1 and Time 2.

If differ-

ences on this measure are observed across conditions at Time
1, the Time 1 scores will be entered as a covariate in
statistical computations to insure that performance on the
anagram task was not influenced by motor speed.

This face

valid measure has not been empirically validated but has
been similarly employed in depression research because
psychomotor retardation often accompanies depression (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third
Edition, Revision [DSM-III-R]; American Psychiatric Association, 1987).
Pre-Manipulation Questionnaire (Pre-MC)
Immediately before the anagram task, subjects completed
the Pre-MC (Appendix F), which consists of two items on 11point Likert-type scales:

(a) "Please rate how important it
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is for you to do well on this task," and (b) "Please rate
how much experience you have with this type of task."
questionnaire was included for two reasons.

This

One reason was

to assess whether subjects considered the task to be important, as this was considered a significant difference
between the current task and the task employed in Weary and
Williams (1990).

The other reason was to control, if

differences exist across conditions, for the effects of
perceived task importance and prior experience on anagram
performance by including the items as covariates in statistical analyses.
Manipulation Checks
Post-performance Manipulation Check Questionnaire (PPMC)
Immediately following the anagram task, subjects
completed a questionnaire (Appendix G) that assessed perceptions of performance and the efficacy of the manipulations.
Subjects were asked if their performance was a success or
failure, and if they expected a second task given success on
the first task.

Then, subjects were asked to rate, on an

11-point Likert-type scale, how difficult they expected the
second task to be compared to the first task.

4

Also on 11-

point Likert-type scales, subjects were asked to rate how
well they performed and their beliefs regarding how well
they performed compared to other participants in the study.
Procedure
(Note:

see Appendix H for the scripts read by experiment-
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ers.)
To increase the atmosphere of evaluation, as in Weary
and Williams (1990), subjects were run one at a time.

Upon

arrival at the laboratory, subjects read and signed a
consent form (Appendix I), which indicated that data would
remain confidential and that subjects could withdraw at any
time without prejudice.

Subjects then completed the Word

Fluency task, the BDI, the Rosenberg Inventory, the MAACLTime 1, and the writing speed task.
Next, to increase the perceived importance of the
anagram task, subjects were told that they were going to
solve some anagrams designed to measure intelligence.

Also,

performance on the anagram task was described as a good
predictor of college grades and aptitude test performance.
An example anagram (Appendix A) was presented and the
criterion for success was described as 13 or more items
correct in 12 minutes or less.
Subjects then completed the Pre-MC questionnaire.

At

this point, half of the depressed and nondepressed subjects
were told that, if and only if they successfully completed
the anagram task, they would perform a second anagram task
(future-performance condition).

The remaining subjects were

told that a second anagram task is normally required if the
first task is successfully completed, but due to time
constraints, no second task performance would be required
(no-future-performance condition).

In addition, one-third
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of the depressed and nondepressed subjects were told that
the second anagram task is very difficult compared to the
first (harder expectancy condition); another third were told
that the second anagram task is similar to the first (similar expectancy condition); the remaining third were told
that the second anagram task is very easy compared to the
first (easier expectancy condition).

A stopwatch was then

placed in front of the subjects and they were reminded of
the criteria for success.
The anagram task was then administered.

The experi-

menter was present while subjects worked, and to heighten
further the atmosphere of evaluation, as in Weary and
Williams (1990), the experimenter frequently recorded bogus
notes.

After the maximum time (12 minutes) had elapsed,

subjects completed the PPMC questionnaire.

The experimenter

then scored the anagram task and told subjects whether their
performance was a success or failure.

Immediately after

hearing this, subjects completed the writing speed task, the
MAACL-Time 2, and the PAQ.
(Appendix I) and dismissed.

Finally, subjects were debriefed

CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Because this study was not designed to assess the role
of gender in depressive self-presentation, and because the
number of males in each cell was very low, all analyses were
collapsed across gender.

Due to missing responses for some

questions/tasks, degrees of freedom varied across analyses.
Manipulation Checks
Future Performance Manipulation
To assess the efficacy of the future performance
manipulation, item 4 from the PPMC was analyzed.

The

question asked if subjects expected a second task upon
successful completion of the first task ("yes" or "no").
inspection of the frequencies of "yes" and "no" responses
per group indicated that all subjects responded in the
appropriate manner.
Difficulty Expectancy Manipulation
Item 5 from the PPMC, which asked subjects how difficult the second task would be compared to the first, was
analyzed to assess the effectiveness of the difficulty
expectancy manipulation.

Fourteen subjects were omitted

from the final sample because they failed to answer this
question (see note 4).

Table 2 presents the number of
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Table 2
Number of Missing Responses to PPMC Item 5, Per Condition.
Difficulty Expectancy

Depressed
Future Task
Expected
No Future Task
Expected
Nondepressed
Future Task
Expected
No Future Task
Expected

Easier

Similar

Harder

0

0

0

1

2

1

0

0

0

2

4

4

subjects with a missing response, per condition.
As can be seen, all such subjects were in the no-future
performance condition.
Concerns over whether inclusion of these subjects would
have altered the results of computations were attenuated
because there was no strong cause to believe that these
subjects experienced the manipulation of difficulty expectancy differently than other subjects since a "mechanical"/non-systematic problem (other than selecting no-futureperformance subjects) led to their omitting a response.
Indeed, Chi-square goodness of fit tests revealed no evidence of a non-random distribution of the number of subjects
missing a response across the difficulty expectancy conditions, in both depressed

(~

2

(2)

= .50, 2 >.05) and non-
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depressed

(~

2

(2) = .80, 2 >.OS) groups.

PPMC, item 5, was a Likert-type question, bounded by 0
("much easier") and 10 ("much harder"), and was thus analyzed with a 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty
expectancy) analysis of variance (ANOVA).

As expected, only

a difficulty expectancy main effect was found (F(2,283) =
486.21, 2 < .0001).

Follow-up contrasts indicated that the

manipulation of difficulty expectancy was effective.
Subjects in the harder condition (M = 8.54, SD = 1.58) rated
the second task as harder than subjects in the similar
condition(~=

5.46, SD= 1.17; !(194) =15.56, 2 < .001),

and subjects in the similar condition rated the second task
as harder than subjects in the easier condition

(~

= 1.64,

SD= 1.69; t(l94) =18.56, 2 < .001).
Control Variables
Word Fluency
To determine whether groups differed at time 1 in terms
of subjects' facility with words, a mood x future performance x difficulty expectancy ANOVA was conducted with word
fluency scores as the dependent variable.

No effects

emerged, although there was a trend for the future performance variable (f(l,297) = 3.77, 2 = .053).

Subjects in the

future-performance condition tended to perform better (M =
47.46, SD= 10.51) than subjects in the no-future-performance condition (M = 45.20, SD= 11.89).

Given that this

difference was small (effect size of roughly .2; see Cohen,
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1988), and nonsignificant, no statistical control for this
variable was attempted in subsequent analyses.

It is

noteworthy also that, if subjects in the future-performance
condition fail more than subjects in the no-future performance conditions, this would not be attributable to poorer
verbal ability, as measured by the word fluency task.
Writing Speed
To assess whether groups differed in motor speed at
time 1, a 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty
expectancy) ANOVA was conducted with time 1 writing speed as
the dependent variable. 5

Only a mood x future performance

interaction was uncovered {F(l,295)

=

6.79, £ < .01).

As

can be seen in Table 3, follow-up Tukey (HSD) contrasts
indicated that groups were not significantly different from
each other (£S > .OS), despite the apparent disordinal
interaction.

Accordingly, no attempt was made, in subse-

quent analyses, to control for motor speed differences.
Pre-MC Questionnaire
Importance ratings (item 1)
There were two reasons for obtaining ratings of the
importance of the first task.

One reason was to assess

whether statistical control for differences in importance
ratings would be required; another reason was to determine
whether subjects considered the experimental task to be
important.

A 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty

expectancy) ANOVA with item 1 of the Pre-MC as the dependent
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Table 3
writing Speed Means and Standard Deviations Across Mood and
Future Performance Variables.
Future Performance
Expected
Depressed

Not Expected

M 58.78a
SD 7.95
n
55

55.37a
10.26
96

M 55.28a
SD 9.10
n
55

57.71a
10.20
101

Nondepressed

Note: Different superscripts denote a significant difference, at 2 < .05, according to Tukey (HSD) computations.
variable found no effects (2s >.05), which indicated that no
control for importance ratings would be necessary.

The

overall mean of 6.23 (SD= 2.43) out of 10 indicated that
subjects rated the first task as reasonably important (0 =
"not at all important" and 10 ="very important").
Experience with anagram tasks (item 2)
To assess whether differences in anagram experience
existed across conditions, item 2 of the Pre-MC was submitted to a 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty
expectancy) ANOVA.

Because this analysis did not yield any

effects (2s > .05), no statistical control for anagram
experience was attempted in subsequent analyses.

On the O

("no experience at all") to 10 ("a lot of experience")
scale, subjects' ratings averaged 3.63 (SD= 2.20), suggest-
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ing that most subjects had some experience doing anagrams.
Anagram Performance
Success/Failure Analysis
Whether subjects would fail (i.e., answer less than 13
anagrams correctly in the allotted 12 minutes) was predicted
to depend on subjects' mood, whether they expected a future
task, and whether the future task would be easier, similar,
or harder than the first.

Specifically, among the no-

future-performance conditions, failure was predicted to be
no more likely for depressed subjects than for nondepressed
subjects, across the levels of difficulty expectancy.
Moreover, little or no failure was predicted for these
groups.

On the other hand, among the future-performance

conditions, depressed subjects were expected to fail more
often in the harder condition than the control condition,
and more often in the control condition than the easier
condition.

In contrast, it was hypothesized that non-

depressed subjects would not fail in any of the futureperformance conditions, regardless of the expected difficulty of the second task.
To test these predictions, the mood, future performance, and difficulty expectancy variables were effect coded
(see, for example, Cohen & Cohen, 1983, pp. 198-204) and
submitted to a logistic regression analysis.

Main effects

were entered first, followed by 2-way then 3-way interactions.

For the omnibus test, a 3-way interaction was
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expected.

Moreover, following this omnibus test, simple

effects analyses and planned comparisons were expected to
support the specific hypotheses for this study.

Table 4

displays the number of failures observed for each condition;
Table 5 shows the results of the omnibus logistic regression
analysis.
As can be seen in Table 4, only 9 subjects failed (3%
of~);

one was depressed.

Despite this, the logistic

regression analysis (see Table 5) was conducted, and, not
surprisingly, no effects (2s > .9) were found.

To investi-

gate why some subjects failed the task--given that it was
not due to mood, future performance, nor difficulty expectancy--Word Fluency scores were compared between subjects
who failed and subjects who passed.

This analysis revealed

a significant mean difference (!(307) = 2.72, 2

< .01),

suggesting that failure in this study was due to poor verbal
ability

(~pass

= 46.61, SD= 11.11; M fail = 36.33, SD=

12.86).
Performance Score Analysis
As was the case with the success/failure measure,
subjects' scores on the anagram task were predicted to
depend on subjects' mood, whether they expected a future
task, and whether the future task was easier, similar, or
harder than the first.

It was predicted that among

the no-future-performance conditions, no differences in
performance would emerge for depressed subjects, nor for
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Table 4
Observed Failures Across Mood, Future Performance, and
Difficulty Expectancy Conditions.
Difficulty Expectancy

Depressed
Future Task
Expected
No Future Task
Expected
Nondepressed
Future Task
Expected
No Future Task
Expected

Easier

Similar

Harder

0
( 19)

0
(18)

0
(18)

0
( 19)

1
(20)

0
(18)

1
( 31)

2
(33)

0
(32)

0
(33)

2
(35)

3
(33)

Note: Values in parentheses are cell sizes.
nondepressed subjects, across the levels of difficulty
expectancy.

However, among the future-performance

conditions, depressed subjects were expected to perform more
poorly in the harder condition than the similar condition,
and more poorly in the similar condition than the easier
condition.

In contrast, it was hypothesized that no perfor-

mance differences would emerge for nondepressed subjects in
any of the future-performance conditions.
To test these predictions, a 3-way (mood x future
performance x difficulty expectancy) ANOVA was conducted
with the number of incorrect (blanks were coded as
incorrect) anagrams as the dependent variable.

Because

48
Table 5
Logistic Regression of Mood, Future Performance, and Difficulty Expectancy on Success/Failure.
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig

M
FP
EXP
Term 1
Term 2

-2.3588
-.8579

21.4878
21.4878

-1.7014
3.1282

32.0127
26.3157

.0120
.0016
.0142
.0028
. 0141

1
1
2
1
1

.9126
.9682
.9929
.9576
.9054

M x FP
M x EXP
Term 1
Term 2
FP x EXP
Term 1
Term 2

-.6852

21.4878

.0010

.1583
-.0420

32.0127
26.3157

3.0583
-1.4411

32.0127
26.3157

.0000
.0095
.0091
.0030

1
2
1
1
2
1
1

.9746
1. 0000
.9961
.9987
.9953
.9239
.9563

M x FP x EXP
-1.5152
Term 1
Term 2
-1. 6450

32.0127
26.3157

.0100
.0022
.0039

2
1
1

.9950
.9622
.9502

.oooo
.oooo

Note: M = Mood; FP = Future Performance; EXP = Difficulty
Expectancy.
"Term" refers to an effect coded interaction
variable.
subjects who failed the first task had lower verbal ability
than other subjects, and because their performance scores
were extreme within their groups, subjects who failed were
omitted from all performance score analyses (remaining N
300).

6

=

Table 6 presents the results of the omnibus

ANOVA; Table 7 displays the mean anagram score and standard
deviation per condition.
As can be seen in Table 6, although the results
revealed no reliable effects (2s > .OS), there was a trend
for the predicted 3-way interaction among the mood, future
performance, and difficulty expectancy variables (F(2, 288)
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Table 6
Mood, Future Performance, and Difficulty Expectancy ANOVA
with Number of Incorrect Anagrams as Dependent Variable .
source

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

M
FP
EXP
M x FP
M x EXP
F x EXP
M x FP x EXP
ERROR

65.24
0.29
88.34
37.46
61. 69
1. 25
128.15
7357.65

1
1
2
1
2
2
2
288

65.24
0.29
44.17
37.46
30.84
0.63
64.08
25.55

Note: M = Mood; FP
Expectancy.

= 2.51, 2

< .10)

7

.

F
2.55
0.01
1. 73
1. 47
1. 21
0.02
2.51

0.111
0.916
0.179
0.227
0.301
0.975
0.083

= Future Performance; EXP = Difficulty

Given this, a simple effects ANOVA was

conducted to determine if, as predicted, there was a mood x
difficulty expectancy interaction for future-performance
subjects but not the no-future-performance subjects.
Indeed, while there was no mood x difficulty expectancy
interaction for no-future-performance subjects (F(2, 288) =
.75, 2 > .05), a trend was observed for the simple interaction among the future-performance subjects (F(2, 288)
2.95, 2

=

= .054).

To investigate further the simple mood x difficulty
expectancy interaction trend for future-performance subjects, follow-up simple effect ANOVAs were conducted.
Results indicated that, in contrast to predictions, there
was no effect of difficulty expectancy for depressed-futureperformance subjects (f(2, 288) = 1.02, 2 > .05).

There
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Table 7
Mean Number of Incorrect Anagrams and Standard Deviations
Across Mood, Future Performance, and Difficulty Expectancy
Conditions.
Difficulty Expectancy

Depressed
Future Task
Expected
No Future Task
Expected
Nondepressed
Future Task
Expected
No Future Task
Expected

Easier

Similar

Harder

M
SD
n

6.47a
5.64
19

4.50a
5.24
18

6.67a
5.69
18

M
SD
n

8.05a
6.02
19

6.42a
4.79
19

5.56a
5.74
18

M
SD
n

6.73al
4.92
30

6.55a
5.38
31

3.66a 2
4.11
32

M
SD
n

4.94a
4.81
33

5.06a
4.58
33

4.93a
4.69
30

Note: Different lettered superscripts indicate a significant (E < .05) difference according to exploratory (all
cells) Tukey (HSD) contrasts. Different number superscripts
indicate a significant difference for a posteriori Tukey
(HSD) follow-up contrasts. Higher scores indicate worse
performance.

was, however, an unexpected effect of difficulty expectancy
for nondepressed-future-performance subjects (f(2,288) =
3.67, E < .05).

According to the follow-up Tukey (HSD)

contrasts (see Table 7), this was due to nondepressedfuture-performance-harder subjects (M = 3.66, SD= 4.11)
performing better than nondepressed-future-performanceeasier subjects

(~

= 6.73, SD= 4.92; E < .05).
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Finally, as an exploratory analysis, a comparison of
the means across all conditions was conducted.

Tukey (HSD)

contrasts indicated that no observed group differences could
be attributed to more than chance variation (alpha = .05;
see Table 7).

8

Affective Distress
One purpose of measuring affective distress was to
determine whether depressed subjects who failed experienced
subsequent distress, as predicted.

Unfortunately, a test of

this prediction was not possible, given that only one
depressed subject failed.

However, a comparison between the

Time 2 affective distress of subjects who passed and subjects who failed was conducted to determine whether subjects
who failed should be omitted from subsequent distress
analyses.

The concern was that subjects who failed might be

considerably more distressed than the majority of their
group (i.e., because of these subjects, group means might be
distorted from skewness).

To address this concern, a 1-way

analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted for the
success and failure groups, with MAACL-T2 as the dependent
variable and MAACL-Tl as the covariate.

The data were

suitable for this analysis insofar as the assumption of
parallelism (homogeneity of regression) was supported (f(l,
305)

=

.27, 2 = .60; see Engelman for a description of the

statistical computation, 1990), and a linear relationship
was established between the dependent variable (MAACL-T2)
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and the covariate (MAACL-Tl), for each group (F(l, 306) =
248.45, £ < .001; see Engelman, 1990).

Results indicated no

difference in Time-2 affective distress between subjects who
passed

(~

= 13.81, SD = 6.97) and subjects who failed

15.44, SD= 6.11; F(l, 306) = .07, £ = .79).

(~

=

Thus, there

was no need to omit subjects who failed from remaining
distress analyses.
Another purpose of measuring distress was to assess the
impact of the future performance and difficulty expectancy
manipulations on depressed and nondepressed subjects.

An

omnibus 3-way (mood x future performance x difficulty
expectancy) interaction was expected to surface because of a
simple interaction for depressed but not nondepressed
subjects.

Specifically, depressed subjects were expected to

experience more distress from the future-performance-harder
condition than from the future-performance-similar condition, and more distress from the future-performance-similar
condition than from the future-performance-harder condition.
On the other hand, in the no-future-performance conditions,
no effect of difficulty expectancy was predicted for depressed subjects.

Finally, nondepressed subjects were not

expected to evidence (statistically) an impact of the future
performance variable nor the difficulty expectancy variable.
To test these predictions, a 3-way (mood x future
performance x difficulty expectancy) ANCOVA was conducted,
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with MAACL-T2 as the dependent variable, and with MAACL-Tl
and the number of incorrect anagrams (to control for the
effects of performance on affective distress) as covar. t es. 9
ia

The assumption of parallelism (homogeneity of

regression) was supported (fanagrams (11, 285) = 1.01, £ =
.44; fMAACL-Tl (11, 285) = .39, £ = .96; see Engelman,
1990), and a linear relationship was established between the
dependent variable (MAACL-T2) and the covariates for each
group (fanagrams (1, 296) = 9.58, £ < .003; fMAACL-Tl (1,
296) = 222.26, £ < .001; see Engelman, 1990).

However, the

Levene statistic (f(ll, 297) = 2.05, £ = .02) indicated that
the homogeneity of variance assumption for the MAACL-T2
scores was not supported.

Thus, a square-root transforma-

tion (indicated by the slope of a spread-level plot; see
Norusis, 1990, pp. 99-101) of the MAACL-T2 scores was
performed, successfully (Levene's f(ll, 297) = 1.85, £ =
.054), prior to the ANCOVA.
Results revealed a significant main effect of mood
(F(l, 295) = 5.32, £ < .OS), which was due to depressed
subjects experiencing less distress

(adjusted~=

3.43) than

nondepressed subjects (adjusted M = 3.67), and a trend for
the future performance x difficulty expectancy interaction
(f(2, 295) = 2.83, £ = .06).

To follow-up the interaction

trend, simple effects ANCOVAs were conducted.

Results

indicated no simple effect of difficulty expectancy at the
future-performance level, nor at the no-future-performance
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level.

To investigate, then, why the future performance x

difficulty expectancy trend was observed, the adjusted means
were inspected.

As can be seen in Table 8, the interaction

was likely due to lower distress among subjects who were not
expecting a harder future task than among subjects who were
expecting the harder second task (f(l,295)

= 7.62, E

<

.01).

No simple future-performance effect was found at the similar-expectancy condition nor the easier-expectancy condition

(£S > .05).
Finally, an exploratory analysis of all remaining group
comparisons was performed.
conducting
possible

~-tests

~-tests

Engelman's (1990) procedure for

on adjusted means was used to perform all

(df

=

301).

With a Bonferroni-adjustment

of the £-value (.004, representing .OS divided by the 12 new
contrasts), results indicated that no group differences
could be attributed to more than chance variation (Es >
. 05) .
Causal Attributions
In brief, the prediction for causal attributions was
simple but bold:
conditions.

no differences in attributions among

The most theoretically important null finding

was predicted for a comparison between depressed subjects
who failed and depressed subjects who did not fail.

Of

course, this test could not be conducted because only one
depressed subject failed.

Nonetheless, to investigate

whether any unexpected effects transpired, a 3-way (mood x
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Table 8
Adjusted Mean Time 2 Distress Across Future Performance and
Difficulty Expectancy Conditions.
Difficulty Expectancy
Easier

Similar

Future Task
Expected

Ad"M
J_
n

3.50a
50

3.58a
51

No Future Task
Expected

Ad"M
J_
n

3.64a
52

3.45a
55

Harder
3.86al
50
3.46a 2
51

Note: Covariates were the number of incorrect anagrams and
Time 1 Distress (MAACL-Tl). MAACL-T2 scores were transformed (power = .5) prior to their adjustment. Different
number superscripts denote a significant difference (£ <
.05); different letter superscripts denote a significant
difference (£ < .05) according to Bonferroni criteria.
Higher scores indicate greater distress.

future performance x difficulty expectancy) ANOVA was
conducted for each one of the attribution variables (Task
difficulty, Effort, Ability, Luck, Control, InternalityExternality, Stability-Instability, Global-Specific, Importance).

10

Because this analysis involved 63 tests (i.e.,

the probability of a Type I error was very high, predicting
3.15 spurious effects), a Bonferroni adjustment of the
critical £-value for each test was necessary (see Stevens,
1992, pp. 6-9).

The Bonferroni critical £-value was set to

.001 (.05 divided by 63 tests).
None of the 3-way ANOVAs yielded an effect that could
be associated with more than chance variation (£S > .05).
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In fact, none of the effects reached the trend level of
significance (£S > .10).

The strongest effect was found for

the Internality-Externality analysis.

The mood variable

reached an adjusted significance level of .25.

11

Although

it was questionable to follow-up an effect with a £-value of
.25, the depressed and nondepressed means were nonetheless
compared on the Internality-Externality ratings.

Depressed

subjects (M
- = 2.72, SD= 1.37, -N = 112) tended to attribute
~

the cause of their performance to external causes more than
nondepressed subjects

(~

= 2.26, SD= 1.26, N = 197).

Self-Evaluation
Depressed subjects were expected to have lower selfevaluation scores (i.e., Rosenberg scores) than nondepressed
subjects, while no effects were expected for the difficulty
expectancy nor the future performance variables, nor their
interaction(s) with mood, because these manipulations were
implemented after the administration of the Rosenberg
questionnaire.

To test these predictions, a 3-way ANOVA was

conducted with Rosenberg scores as the dependent measure.
Results revealed an unexpected significant main effect of
future performance (K(l, 297) = 6.23, £ < .05), which
indicated that future-performance subjects (M = 32.40, SD =
4.99, N = 151) had slightly higher self-evaluations than nofuture-performance subjects

(~

= 31.52, SD= 5.52,

~

= 158).

This effect was qualified, however, by a significant mood by
future performance interaction (K(l, 297) = 6.66, £ < .05).
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To explore the mood x future performance interaction,
inspections of the cell means and follow-up Tukey (HSD)
contrasts (see Table 9) were executed.

Both procedures

suggested that the interaction was due to higher selfevaluations for depressed-future-performance subjects than
for depressed-no-future-performance subjects (effect size of
roughly .6, which is considered to be of medium magnitude;
Cohen, 1988).

This unexpected finding was deemed important
12
to keep in mind during the discussion of results.
The
remaining differences across the four conditions were in
line with predictions:

Both depressed-future-performance

subjects and depressed-no-future-performance subjects had
lower self-esteem than either of the nondepressed groups
(future-performance and no-future-performance; 2s < .OS).
Table 9
Self-evaluation (Rosenberg Self-esteem) Means and Standard
Deviations Across Mood and Future Performance Variables.
Future Performance
Expected
Depressed

Not Expected

M 29.29a
SD 3.94
n
55

26.70bc
5.17
57

M 34.19b
SD 4.66
n
96

34.24b
3.50
101

Nondepressed

Note: Different superscripts denote a significant difference, at 2 < .OS, according to Tukey (HSD) computations.

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to test Hill et al.'s
(1986) theory of depressive self-presentation.

The main

theses of this perspective are that depressed individuals
intentionally employ protective (conservative) social
strategies, and that avoidance of performance demands and
potential loss to self-esteem are primary goals of these
strategies.

In addition, Hill et al. claimed that depres-

sives would be willing to endure short-term negative consequences to achieve these goals.

This chapter discusses the

results of this study in terms of their implications for
depressive self-presentation theory.

First, a weakness

(methodological/statistical) of the current study is presented.

Second, the results for the secondary variables

(causal attributions, self-evaluations, and affective
distress) are discussed.

Third, subjects' actual perfor-

mance (success/failure, incorrect anagrams), the main
dependent variable, is discussed.

Finally, a summary and

conclusions are presented.
Methodological/Statistical Considerations
The major weakness of the current experiment was low
statistical power.

This problem, which runs rampant in many
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areas of research (see Cohen, 1988), was unavoidable because
of time and resource constraints.

The main danger in the

current study was that legitimate effects might have failed
to reach statistical significance.

To help combat this

danger, powerful statistical tests were used for the a
priori analyses (e.g., simple effects analyses instead of
standard group contrasts).
Discussion of Results
Secondary Variables
Affective distress
Hill et al.

(1986) predicted that a future performance

would be particularly disturbing to depressed subjects.
Also, based on Hill et al.'s theory, it was expected that,
for depressed-future-performance subjects, distress would
increase as the expected difficulty of the second task
increased.

The results were at odds with the predictions.

First, depressed subjects were less distressed than nondepressed subjects overall, and second, depressed and
nondepressed subjects were affected similarly by the future
performance and difficulty expectancy manipulations.

The

only significant group difference indicated that all subjects (depressed and nondepressed) expecting a harder future
task experienced more distress than subjects (depressed and
nondepressed) not expecting a harder future task.
Hill et al.

(1986) should address these findings if

they wish to maintain that depressed subjects experience
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more social anxiety than nondepressed subjects when confronted with future performances.

In addition, these

researchers should answer the following question:

Why did

depressed subjects in the future-performance-harder condition not evidence more depressive self-presentations (via
performance scores) than depressed subjects in the nofuture-performance-harder condition?

Depressed-future-

performance-harder subjects were more distressed than
depressed-no-future-performance-harder subjects, yet this
distress did not lead, as hypothesized, to an increase in
depressive self-presentations.
Surely, more powerful future research is needed to
address these issues.

It is also possible that social

anxiety was not well assessed with the current measure of
distress (the MAACL), or that the composite distress score
concealed or modified effects.

At the least, however, these

findings underscore the dangers of imposing mechanistic
constraints on an intention-based theoretical formulation.
Recall (see Chapter I, pp. 4-5) that Hill et al. 's (1986)
theory was considered metatheoretically inconsistent,
proposing a mechanistic cause of depressives' intentional
presentations.

If Hill et al.

(1986) used only intentions

as explanatory concepts, a subject could behave in accordance with the mechanistic laws relating social anxiety and
performance, or not (see Rychlak, 1990).

Because Hill et

al. proposed that depressives' intentional self-presenta-
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tions result from increased social anxiety, they must now
explain how subjects managed to "break" the mechanistic laws
related to social anxiety in order to succeed.
Causal attributions
No effects of mood, future performance, nor difficulty
expectancy were found for causal attributions.

Whether

there were truly no effects is plainly an open question
because of the low power of the current study.

Future

research should investigate further, perhaps as the primary
purpose of the investigation, whether verbalized (or written) attributions are best understood as self-presentations.
In the meantime, it does not seem safe to conclude that
these results support Hill et al. 's theory, or not.
Self-evaluations
As Hill et al.

(1986) suggested, depressed subjects

maintained lower self-evaluations than nondepressed subjects.

What was not assessed with the current design was

whether lower self-evaluations increase the likelihood of
the adoption of depressive self-presentations.

However,

such a test would be difficult precisely because of the
close relationship between depression and self-esteem.

That

is, if one were to remove self-esteem variability from
depression, or vice versa, a highly contrived, virtually
meaningless construct would remain.

Or, put another way,

there are likely very few high-self-esteem depressed subjects to examine vis-a-vis low-self-esteem depressed sub-
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jects.

Certainly, this is an issue requiring additional

theoretical and empirical work.
Anagram Performance
Strategic failure
Weary and Williams (1990) claimed that, by failing,
depressed subjects went "beyond self-handicapping," to a
more pathological form of self-presentation (p. 896).
Further, these authors suggested that depressed people might
regularly behave this way, resulting in the maintenance of
their "shaky self-confidence," and in turn their depression
(pp. 897-898).

These strong conclusions were challenged by

the current experimental design.

Most relevant to the

challenge was the use of an important task, rather than a
trivial task (as in Weary and Williams, 1990).

The goal was

to determine whether depressives strategically fail when it
matters most, when failure will have longer-term consequences (i.e., self-esteem loss; or reduction of "selfconfidence").

Interestingly, the present results displayed

no evidence of strategic failure among subjects, regardless
of the expected difficulty of the second task.
Two conclusions are worthy of discussion.

One is that

Weary and Williams (1990) were victims of an experimental
fluke, that their finding was not reliable, and depressives
do not strategically fail.

This view is not favored,

however, precisely because the current study employed a very
different task than Weary and Williams (1990).

The pre-
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ferred conclusion is that there are boundaries to strategic
failure.

Depressed subjects might fail trivial tasks (Weary

and Williams, 1990), yet try to pass/succeed on important
tasks (as in the current study).

Why would depressed

subjects fail a trivial task yet not fail an important task?
Perhaps the self-esteem cost (a long-term consequence) of
poor current task performance is carefully considered before
intentional failure is invoked.
disparate findings:

This would explain the

When the self-esteem cost of failure

was high for a current task (the current study), depressed
subjects did not strategically fail, but when the selfesteem cost of failure was low (as in Weary and Williams,
1990), failure was chosen as a means of avoidance.
In brief, the suggestion is that depressives are
primarily protective of their self-esteem.

Avoidance of

performance demands is one potential way to protect selfesteem, but it is only used if avoidance itself will not
jeopardize self-esteem.

This contrasts with Hill et al.

(1986) because they did not assign top priority to the goal
of self-esteem protection.

On the other hand, insofar as

depressives might still intentionally fail when short-term
consequences result (as in Weary and Williams, 1990), this
explanation is in accord with Hill et al. 's (1986) theory.
The important point is that the short-term consequences of
failure must not endanger self-esteem.

Thus, unlike the

conclusions of Weary and Williams (1990), depressives are
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not hypothesized to maintain their "shaky self-confidence,"
and in turn their depression, from strategic failures,
because this strategy is only used when there is little
threat to self-esteem ("self-confidence") from current
performances.
Unfortunately, this speculation is based on the validity of comparing Weary and Williams's (1990) findings with
those of the current study.

Future strategic failure

research should experimentally assess whether current task
importance (self-esteem cost) is associated with a depressed
person's decision about whether to fail.
Performance scores
Performance scores indicated no statistical evidence of
depressive self-presentation, despite the omnibus 3-way
interaction trend, and the significant simple mood x diff iculty expectancy interaction for future performance subjects.

Regardless of how difficult the second task was

described to be, and regardless of whether the second task
was expected, there were no reliable differences among
depressed groups.

Although it is tempting to suggest that

Hill et al.'s (1986) theory is now invalidated, to do so
would be inappropriate and premature, largely because of the
low statistical power of the current study.

Certainly, more

powerful research should attempt to replicate the current
design, or a similar design, before one "accepts" the null
hypothesis of no group differences.
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Discussion Summary and Conclusions
The most striking finding was that depressed subjects
did not intentionally fail an important task.

This was true

even when a very difficult future task was contingent upon
successful completion of the first task, and when increased
distress accompanied the expectation of a very difficult
future task.
primary.

It seems that self-esteem protection is

Avoidance of performance demands might be a

significant goal of depressive self-presentation; however,
when avoidance itself endangers self-esteem, it seems
depressed people will put forth effort in order to perform
well.

So why then do depressed people frequently perform

poorly on tasks requiring concentration, memory, and so on
(see Gotlib & Hammen, 1992, pp. 113-139)?
Based on the current study, one might expect that, with
important tasks, the only role intentional performance plays
is in the exacerbation of poor perf ormance--maybe something
akin to giving up.

Perhaps depressed people assess how well

they are doing, accurately determine that they are experiencing difficulty, and then "throw in the towel."

If this

is the case, failure may indeed assist in the maintenance
and exacerbation of depression; however, this would not be
intentional failure, per se (i.e., the sort of failure
discussed in Weary & Williams, 1990).
Consider also that depressed subjects in the current
study were less distressed overall than nondepressed sub-
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jects.

Who would expect that, under public conditions,

depressed subjects would report less distress than nondepressed subjects?

What protective goal would be served by

reporting less distress?

From a self-presentation perspec-

tive, this presentation of affect was anything but conservative or protective.

So what were depressed subjects doing?

Given that this experiment was a rare opportunity for
depressed subjects to succeed on an important task (by
design), it seems probable that they were capitalizing on an
opportunity to gain self-esteem, and that they perhaps
enjoyed some comfort as a result.

This is absolutely

contrary to Hill et al., who made clear their belief in the
protective orientation of depressives.
The foregoing analysis underscores the potential
complexity of depressive self-presentation.

It seems that

depressives might intentionally perform poorly on trivial
tasks for the sake of avoidance; yet, on important tasks,
depressed people might perform poorly because of some type
of deficits (e.g., see Gotlib & Hammen, 1992), combined
possibly with a variant of giving up (intentional component).

However, depressed individuals seem to notice when

they are capable of performing well on an important task,
and at these times, they might shift to an acquisitive selfpresentation style, whereby, like nondepressed individuals,
they are interested in gaining self-esteem.

Future research

should substantiate these interesting speculations.
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APPENDIX A
ANAGRAM TASK

TLNPA
OLBKC
TYHUO
LC WON
MWNOA
MUCBR
LVOGE
THGIF
ETRDN
YORLG
NDRIK
ULTQI
OUPRG
HTMOU
CEUJI
ITGLH
AHTMC
ESHUO
NPLAK
BHNCE
HO PRC
PKANR
TNRGA
NHACR
WROFN
CUT KR
WAEHT
UHOCG
ODWRL
CPHIM
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EXAMPLE ANAGRAM

LAM BU
Answer

= ALBUM
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APPENDIX B
MULTIPLE AFFECT ADJECTIVE CHECKLISTS

MAACL-A
on this sheet you will find words which describe different
kinds of moods and feelings.
Place a check in the s~ace
beside the words which describe the way you are feeling
rifht now, not the way you felt five minutes ago or when you
go up, but ri~ht now. Some of the words may be alike, but
check all of t e words that describe your feelings right
now.
1.

active

24.

irritated

2.

afraid

25.

joyful

3.

agreeable

26.

lonely

4.

alone

27.

low

5.

angry

28.

mean

6.

blue

29.

merry

7.

calm

30.

nervous

8.

clean

31.

outraged

9.

contented

32.

pleasant

10.

cooperative

33.

polite

11.

cruel

34.

rejected

12.

devoted

35.

safe

13.

discontented

36.

shaky

14.

discouraged

37.

steady

15.

enraged

38.

suffering

16.

fearful

39.

tame

17.

fine

40.

terrible

18.

free

41.

understanding

19.

glad

42.

unhappy

20.

gloomy

43.

unsociable

21.

good-natured

44.

upset

22.

healthy

45.

whole

23.

interested
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MAACL-B
On this sheet you will find words which describe different
kinds of moods and feelings.
Place a check in the space
beside the words which describe the way you are feeling
right now, not the way you felt five minutes ago or when you
got up, but right now. Some of the words may be alike, but
check all of the words that describe your feelings right
now.
1.

alive

24.

lucky

2.

amiable

25.

mad

3.

awful

26.

miserable

4.

bitter

27.

off ended

5.

cheerful

28.

panicky

6.

desperate

29.

peaceful

7.

destroyed

30.

sad

8.

disagreeable

31.

secure

9.

disgusted

32.

stormy

10.

enthusiastic

33.

strong

11.

fit

34.

sunk

12.

forlorn

35.

sympathetic

13.

friendly

36.

tender

14.

frightened

37.

tense

15.

furious

38.

thoughtful

16.

gay

39.

tormented

17.

good

40.

vexed

18.

happy

41.

warm

19.

hopeless

42.

willful

20.

inspired

43.

wilted

21.

kindly

44.

worrying

22.

lost

45.

young

23.

loving
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APPENDIX C
PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE
I.D. #

Performance Attributions
1.

To what extent was your success or failure on the task
due to how easy or difficult the task was:
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----1----0----9----10
very
not
much
at all

2.

To what extent was your success or failure due to how
much effort you put into doing the task:
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----1----0----9----10
very
not
much
at all

3.

To what extent was your success or failure due to your
ability?
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10
not
very
at all
much

4.

To what extent was your success or failure due to luck?
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10
not
very
at all
much

5.

To what extent was your success or failure under your
control?
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10
not
very
at all
much
(over)
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Write in the space provided one major cause for your success
or failure on the task:

6.

Was the cause of your success or failure due to
something about you (internal) or something about other
people or circumstances (external)?
internal

7.

1----2----3----4----5----6

always

Is this cause something that just affects doing this
kind of task, or does it also influence other areas of
your life?
this type

9.

external

In the future when doing a task like this, to what
extent will this cause be present?
never

8.

1----2----3----4----5----6

1----2----3----4----5----6

other areas

How important to you is success or failure on this
task?
not at all

1----2----3----4----5----6

extremely
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APPENDIX D
WORD FLUENCY TASK
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APPENDIX E
WRITING SPEED TASK
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APPENDIX F
PRE-MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE
I.D.#
Pre-MC
Please rate how important it is for you to do well on this
task:
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10
not at all
very
important
important
Please rate how much experience you have with this type of
task:
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10
no
a lot of
experience
experience
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APPENDIX G
POST-PERFORMANCE MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE
I.D.#
PPMC

1.Please rate how you think you did on the anagram task:
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----1----0----9----10
very
very
well
poorly

2.

Please rate how you think you did on the anagram task
compared to other people in the study:
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----1----0----9----10
much
same
much
better
worse

3.

Was your performance on the anagram task a success or
failure, according to the '13 or more correct' rule?
(please circle your choice)
success

4.

failure

Did the experimenter tell you to expect a second
anagram task if you succeed on the first anagram task?
(please circle yes or no)
yes

no

Please rate how easy or difficult you were told
the second anagram task will be compared to the first
task.
0----1----2----3----4----5----6----1----0----9----10
much
much
easier
harder
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APPENDIX H
EXPERIMENTER SCRIPTS

BEGINNING SCRIPT
Hello. My name is
I'm the experimenter
for this study. First of all, thank you for participating.
This will take roughly 40 minutes and, as you probably know,
you will receive extra credit for your psychology class.
In this experiment, we are interested in gathering normative
data on various questionnaires and tasks.
Before we begin,
let me assure you that all data collected will remain
completely confidential and will be used only for the
purposes of this research. All data will be coded, so your
name won't be associated with it.
Here is a consent form.
Please read it carefully.
If you
consent to participate, sign it and give it back to me.
(TAKE CONSENT FORM}
Next, on this paper, I'd like you to write as many words as
possible that begin with the letter 'S'. You will have 5
minutes.
Ready ...... Go.
Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires.
Some
have instructions at the top of the page. Please be sure
you read them carefully. After you're finished, put the
packet of questionnaires in this envelope and give it back
to me.
I'll be
(LOCATION).
(TAKE ENVELOPE AND RETURN TO EXPERIMENT LOCATION)
Next, on this paper, write as many numbers as you can, from
100 backwards. You will have 60 seconds. Ready ....... Go.
(SCORE THE BDI AND SELECT CONDITION FROM THE 'DEP' OR 'NDEP'
LIST.)
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Condition 1--Future Performance/Harder Expectancy
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good
predictor of college grades and aptitude test
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes.
Success is
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to
time and observe you.
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done.
(TAKE ENVELOPE)
o.K.
If, and only if, you successfully complete this task,
you will perform a second anagram task. The second task is
harder than the first.
The words are 14 letters long, as
compared to the first task, which has 5-letter anagrams; the
second task contains words we plan to incorporate into an
intelligence test for graduate students.
Do you have any questions?
(BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED)
O.K. Let me just reiterate that if you get 13 or more
correct in 12 minutes or less, you will perform the second
task as well.
Here's the first task.
Work in any order,
and you may write in the margins of the page.
I'll put this
stopwatch in front of you so you can keep track of the time
that has elapsed.
Ready . . . . . . . . . . . . . go.

(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS
NOTES)
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES)
O.K. Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC).
Thank you. Now, I will score your test.
(SCORE TEST AND
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.)
So now
you (will/will not) be taking the second task.
Before you (leave/do the second task), I would like you to
fill out some additional questionnaires and also--we'll do
this first--on this paper, write as many numbers as you can,
from 100 backwards. You will have 60 seconds.
Ready ........ Go.
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O.K. Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires.
Again, when you're finished place them in this envelope and
give it back to me.
I'll
be
(LOCATION).
(TAKE ENVELOPE, TELL SUBJECT THAT THERE IS NO SECOND
TASK--IT WAS AN EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION. GIVE A
DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, AND THANK SUBJECT)
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Condition 2--Future Performance/Similar Expectancy
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good
predictor of college grades and aptitude test
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to
time and observe you.
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done.
(TAKE ENVELOPE)
O.K.
If, and only if, you successfully complete this task,
you will perform a second task. The second task is similar
to the first.
Do you have any questions?
(BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED)
O.K. Let me just reiterate that if you get 13 or more
correct in 12 minutes or less, you will perform a second
task as well.
Here's the first task. Work in any order,
and you may write in the margins of the page.
I'll put this
stopwatch in front of you so you can keep track of the time
that has elapsed.
Ready ............. go.
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS
NOTES)
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES)
O.K.

Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC).

Thank you. Now, I will score your test.
(SCORE TEST AND
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.)
So now
you (will/will not) be taking the second task.
Before you (leave/do the second task), I would like you to
fill out some questionnaires and also--we'll do this first-on this paper, write as many numbers as you can, from 100
backwards. You will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go.
O.K. Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires.
Again, when you're finished place them in this envelope and
give it back to me.
I'll
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(LOCATION).
(TAKE ENVELOPE, TELL SUBJECT THAT THERE IS NO SECOND
TASK--IT WAS AN EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION. GIVE A
DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, AND THANK SUBJECT)
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Condition 3--Future Performance/Easier Expectancy
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good
predictor of college grades and aptitude test
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to
time and observe you.
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done.
(TAKE ENVELOPE)
O.K.
If, and only if, you successfully complete this task,
you will perform a second anagram task. The second task is
much easier than the first. The words are 3 letters long,
as compared to the first task, which has 5-letter anagrams;
the second task contains words we plan to incorporate into
an intelligence test for junior high school students.
Do you have any questions?
(BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED)
O.K. Let me just reiterate that if you get 13 or more
correct in 12 minutes or less, you will perform the second
task as well.
Here's the first task. Work in any order,
and you may write in the margins of the page.
I'll put this
stopwatch in front of you so you can keep track of the time
that has elapsed.
Ready ............. go.
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS
NOTES)
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES)
O.K.

Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC).

Thank you. Now, I will score your test.
(SCORE TEST AND
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.)
So now
you (will/will not) be taking the second task.
Before you (leave/do the second task), I would like you to
fill out some questionnaires and also--we'll do this first-on this paper, write as many numbers as you can, from 100
backwards. You will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go.
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O.K. Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires.
Again, when you're finished place them in this envelope and
give it back to me.
I'll
be
(LOCATION).
(TAKE ENVELOPE, TELL SUBJECT THAT THERE IS NO SECOND
TASK--IT WAS AN EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION. GIVE A
DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY, AND THANK SUBJECT)
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Condition 4--No Future Performance/Harder Expectancy
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good
predictor of college grades and aptitude test
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes.
Success is
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to
time and observe you.
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done.
(TAKE ENVELOPE)
O.K. Normally, if a subject successfully completes this
task, he or she would perform a second anagram task. The
second task is harder than the first.
The words are 13
letters long, as compared to the first task, which has
5-letter anagrams. However, you won't be performing the
second task because I don't have enough time to administer
it. You will still get full credit though.
Do you have any questions?
(BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED)
O.K. Here's the task. Work in any order, and you may write
in the margins of the page.
I'll put this stopwatch in
front of you so you can keep track of the time that has
elapsed.
Ready . . . . . . . . . . . . . go.

(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS
NOTES)
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES)
O.K.

Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC).

Thank you. Now, I will score your test.
(SCORE TEST AND
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.)
Again,
you will not take a second anagram task.
But before you leave, I would like you to fill out some
questionnaires and also--we'll do this first--on this paper,
write as many numbers as you can, from 100 backwards. You
will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go.
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Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires. Again,
when you're finished place them in this envelope and give it
back to me.
I'll
be
(LOCATION).
(TAKE ENVELOPE, GIVE A DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY,
AND THANK SUBJECT)
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Condition 5--No Future Performance/Similar Expectancy
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good
predictor of college grades and aptitude test
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to
time and observe you.
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done.
(TAKE ENVELOPE)
O.K. Normally, if a subject successfully completes this
task, he or she would perform a second anagram task. The
second task is similar to the first.
However, you won't be
performing the second task because I don't have enough time
to administer it. You will still get full credit though.
Do you have any questions?
(BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED)
O.K. Here's the task. Work in any order, and you may write
in the margins of the page.
I'll put this stopwatch in
front of you so you can keep track of the time that has
elapsed.
Ready ............. go.
(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS
NOTES)
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES)
O.K.

Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC).

Thank you. Now, I will score your test.
(SCORE TEST AND
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.)
Again,
you will not take a second anagram task.
But before you leave, I would like you to fill out some
questionnaires and also--we'll do this first--on this paper,
write as many numbers as you can, from 100 backwards. You
will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go.
Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires. Again,
when you're finished place them in this envelope and give it
back to me.
I'll
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(LOCATION).
(TAKE ENVELOPE, GIVE A DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY,
AND THANK SUBJECT)
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Condition 6--No Future Performance/Easier Expectancy
Next I'd like you to solve some anagrams. As you probably
know, anagrams are words with the letters scrambled. The
problem for you is to unscramble the letters so they form a
word. Here's an example ... (DO SAMPLE PROBLEM) .... The
anagrams you will do are part of an intelligence test that
we're developing. Your score on this test will be a good
predictor of college grades and aptitude test
performance--like the GRE. So far, college students have
successfully completed this task in 12 minutes. Success is
13 or more correct. While your working, I'll be present to
time and observe you.
Now that you understand the task, please fill out this
questionnaire; place it in this envelope when your done.
(TAKE ENVELOPE)
O.K. Normally, if a subject successfully completes this
task, he or she would perform a second anagram task. The
second task is much easier than the first.
The words are 3
letters long, as compared to the first task, which has
5-letter anagrams. However, you won't be performing the
second task because I don't have enough time to administer
it. You will still get full credit though.
Do you have any questions?
(BRIEFLY ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT
ARE RELEVANT TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED)
O.K. Here's the task. Work in any order, and you may write
in the margins of the page.
I'll put this stopwatch in
front of you so you can keep track of the time that has
elapsed.
Ready . . . . . . . . . . . . . go.

(SIT OPPOSITE S, TIME & MONITOR A STOPWATCH, RECORD BOGUS
NOTES)
(STOP SUBJECT AFTER 12 MINUTES)
O.K.

Now fill out this questionnaire (GIVE PPMC).

Thank you. Now, I will score your test.
(SCORE TEST AND
GIVE FEEDBACK--'you passed' OR 'you did not pass'.)
Again,
you will not take a second anagram task.
But before you leave, I would like you to fill out some
questionnaires and also--we'll do this first--on this paper,
write as many numbers as you can, from 100 backwards. You
will have 60 seconds. Ready ........ Go.
Now I'd like you to fill out these questionnaires.

Again,
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when you're finished place them in this envelope and give it
back to me.
I'll
be
(LOCATION).
(TAKE ENVELOPE, GIVE A DEBRIEFING SHEET, GO OVER IT BRIEFLY,
AND THANK SUBJECT)
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APPENDIX I
CONSENT AND DEBRIEF FORMS

Consent Form
The goals of this study are both scientific and
humanitarian. By participating, you will be helping to
expand our scientific knowledge about the relationship
between mood and task performance.
In the study, you will be asked to complete several
questionnaires and to do different tasks that will be
described to you. The study will take about forty minutes,
and for your participation you will receive credit for your
introductory psychology class.
All of the feelings, thoughts, and information that you
provide will remain strictly confidential and will be
published only in the form of statistical summaries. No
individual will be identified.
In fact, you will simply
have a subject number. At the end of the study, you will be
told the purpose and hypotheses of the study in detail. Any
questions you may have about the procedures will be
answered.
If at any time during the course of the study you
feel you cannot complete it, you may withdraw without
penalty.
This study is being conducted under the auspices of Dr.
Jeanne Albright of the Psychology Department of Loyola
University. Please feel free to ask any questions.
If you
would like additional information about the study, you may
also contact the investigator at the location below. Thank
you for your participation in this study.
I have read the above and understand it.

Signature

Date

Evan Finer
Darnen Hall--Room 1028
Department of Psychology
Loyola University
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Debriefing Form
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of
this research is to gain information about the relationship
between mood and our ability to do simple tasks.
In this study, you completed an anagram task. We are
interested in learning whether individuals who are currently
experiencing feelings of depression or sadness take longer
to complete this task, and/or make more errors on this task.
We are also interested in learning whether people will
sometimes try to fail this task in order to avoid having to
do a future task.
Generally, in psychology, researchers are interested in
average responses, so we won't be looking at just your
responses. Instead, we combine the responses from everybody
in the study, and look at how people responded, on the
average. All of your responses are strictly confidential,
and you will never be identified as a subject in this study.
To maintain data integrity, we ask that you not disclose--to
anybody--anything about this study. Your cooperation in
this regard is greatly appreciated.
If you have any questions or comments, or are interested in
receiving feedback about your responses, please contact Dr.
Jeanne Albright of the Psychology Department, 1046 Darnen
Hall, 508-2971.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Effect size estimates were based on Cohen's (1988)
suggestion of dividing the value of the difference between
means by any groups standard deviation ("any" because
variances are assumed equal; e.g., see p.20).

Cohen (1988)

was also the reference for estimating·statistical power and
the magnitude ("large," "medium," or "small") of effect
sizes.
2 This appears to be a manipulation of publicity.
However, because the purpose of this study is to investigate
self-handicapping, and because the experimenter was always
present (i.e., this is not a traditional manipulation of
publicity), this study was presented with the selfhandicapping literature, rather than the public-private
literature.
3

aaumgardner (1991) did not present her data in a

manner that was amenable to deciphering whether the selfhandicapping findings of the Baumgardner et al.

(1985)

study, which did not employ a depressed-nondepressed subject
variable, were replicated.

Thus, the present paper excludes

this discussion.
4

The PPMC questionnaire, item 5, initially only

requested a rating of "how easy or difficult [the subject
was] told the second anagram task [would] be compared to the
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first task" if they responded "yes" to item 4, which asked
whether a subject expected a second task upon successful
completion of the first task.

After running 14 subjects,

the researchers realized that they wanted a rating of the
second task difficulty regardless of whether a subject
expected the second task.

Thus, from that point forward,

the PPMC item 5 was filled out by all subjects.
accomplished by changing the questionnaire.

This was

The revised

form is in appendix G; as can be seen, item 5 was changed
such that it no longer makes responding contingent on
subjects' future performance condition.
5 Two subjects (1 was a nondepressed-future-performancesimilar subject; the other was a nondepressed-futureperformance-harder subject) were omitted from this analysis
because of a mechanical failure:

Their experimental packets

were missing a sheet of paper for this task.
6

Recall that the goal of this study was to examine how

anagram score differences were related to subjects' social
goals (theoretically the avoidance of future performance
demands and potential self-esteem loss), not subjects'
ability.

Thus, subjects with poor verbal ability were not

suitable for the analysis.
7

This 3-way interaction was significant when the

subjects who failed were included in the analysis (I(2, 297)

=

3.78, E
8

=

.02).

Note that the mentioned difference between
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nondepressed-future-performance-harder subjects and
nondepressed-future-performance-easier subjects was based on
Tukey (HSD) contrasts among nondepressed-future-performance
groups (an alpha adjustment for 3 comparisons), not on Tukey
(HSD) contrasts among all groups.

The rationale for

conducting follow-up tests in this manner was that the
former set of contrasts followed from a priori predictions,
while the latter set of contrasts was entirely exploratory.
9 Before conducting the 3-way (mood x future performance
x difficulty expectancy) ANCOVA, a 4-way (mood x future
performance x difficulty expectancy x MAACL order [AB v.
BA]) ANCOVA was conducted to determine whether the order of
administration of the MAACL forms (A, B) had an effect on
distress change scores.
.05).

Results revealed no effects (ps >

Note also that the order of administration of the

MAACL was counterbalanced.
lOA Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was the
planned approach to these tests.

Unfortunately, the MANOVA

could not confidently be conducted because the assumption of
homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrices was not
supported (Box M = 1029.85,

~(495,

44125) = 1.75, 2 < .001;

see Stevens, 1992, pp.265-268).
11

This alpha represents the product of the non-adjusted

p of .004 and 63 comparisons (see Stevens, 1992, pp. 7-9).
All other effects were associated with a probability of a
Type I error above .5.
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12

Although an argument could be levelled against not

statistically removing the effects of self-evaluation (selfesteem) from analyses, the response was that partialling the
effects of self-esteem from depression would remove too much
of depression itself because these constructs are strongly
related, both theoretically (e.g., DSM-III-R; American
Psychiatric Association, 1987), and empirically (e.g., Weary

& Williams, 1990; Socco & Hokanson, 1978; the current study
found that the BDI and the Rosenberg correlated at E = -.65,
2 < .001).

Indeed, in retrospect, the self-evaluation

difference between depressed-future-performance subjects and
depressed-no-future-performance subjects might have been
anticipated based on the difference between these groups on
the BDI (see Method section, subjects subsection).
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